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Abstract 
 
Using survey data we analyze institutional investors’ expectations about the future performance 
of fund managers and the impact of those expectations on asset allocation decisions. We find that 
institutional investors allocate funds mainly on the basis of fund managers’ past performance and 
of investment consultants’ recommendations, but not because they extrapolate their expectations 
from these. This suggests that institutional investors base their investment decisions on the most 
defensible variables at their disposal, and supports the existence of agency considerations in their 
decision making.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Academic studies have traditionally found a strong relationship between past performance and 
investor-directed fund flows (see, for instance, Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002 and Goyal and 
Wahal, 2008, for institutional investors; or Ippolito, 1992, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997 and Sirri 
and Tufano, 1998, for individual investors).
2
 Such studies have frequently attributed this 
relationship to an assumption by investors that past performance will persist (see Lynch and 
Musto, 2003). Berk and Green (2004) provide a slightly different account of this relationship: in 
their model, good past performance signals an asset manager's superior ability, but the 
combination of decreasing returns to size and investors rationally chasing past performance 
means that no differences in future performance are expected. An alternative explanation for the 
importance of past performance is that plan sponsors are hijacked by conflicts. Thus, Lakonishok 
et al. (1992) see the responsiveness of plan sponsors to past performance as possible evidence of 
agency problems within the sponsors’ organizations. Plan sponsor officials, as fiduciaries, have 
reasons to value manager characteristics that are easily justified to superiors or a trustee 
committee. One of the most important of these characteristics is an asset manager’s past 
performance, which is readily observable by the stakeholders of the plan to whom plan sponsor 
officials are answerable. 
In this paper we provide evidence, for the first time, of the actual expectations of plan 
sponsors. Using thirteen years of survey data from Greenwich Associates covering plan sponsors 
with half of the institutional holdings of U.S. equities, we establish a measure of the future 
performance which plan sponsors expect from their asset managers. We then analyze these 
expectations as a function of three sets of possible determinants: first, the past performance of 
the asset managers; second, various non-performance attributes which plan sponsors identify in 
those asset managers; and third, the recommendations of asset managers by investment 
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 Institutional investors include retirement plans, foundations, and university and other endowments (see Section II). 
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consultants. Next we set plan sponsors’ expectations, and the possible drivers of these 
expectations, against the actual future performance of the asset managers. Finally, we compare 
plan sponsors’ expectations of asset manager performance, as well as their past performance, 
consultants’ recommendations, and other factors, with the fund flows in and out of asset 
managers.  
This analysis allows us to test whether the well documented correlation between fund 
flows and past performance results from investors extrapolating future performance from past 
performance, or from agency problems, or both. If the correlation between fund flows and past 
performance results from plan sponsors extrapolating future performance from past performance 
(as implied by Lynch and Musto, 2003 or Ippolito, 1992), then any influence of past performance 
on flows should be channeled through its effect on the expectation of future performance and, to 
the extent that these measures disagree, only expected future performance should matter. Money 
should not flow to funds with good past performance unless investors expect these funds to do 
well in the future as well, and as a result only expected future performance, not past performance 
should be significant in a multivariate regression. On the other hand, suppose that flows respond 
to past performance for agency reasons, as suggested by Lakonishok et al. (1992), with plan 
sponsors herding into these measures to avoid or deflect personal/career risk, rather than using 
past performance to form their expectations of future performance: in this case we should 
observe flows responding to past performance rather than to expected future performance (and to 
that extent only past performance should be significant in a multivariate analysis).
3
 
Our analysis also allows us to extend recent work which has been done on investment 
consultants’ recommendations. Jenkinson et al. (2014) find that consultants’ recommendations 
have a very significant impact on funds flows, but they find no evidence that these 
                                                 
3
 In a more nuanced equilibrium, like that described by Berk and Greene (2004), one should expect to see money 
flows rationally chasing past performance even in the absence of performance persistence, but in that case one 
should also find expected future performance to be the same for all funds (Berk and Greene’s equilibrium condition) 
which we clearly do not observe. 
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recommendations add value to those who follow them. In the present paper we examine the 
extent to which consultants’ recommendations affect the formation of plan sponsors’ 
expectations about the performance of their asset managers, and compare this with the effect of 
these recommendations on flows. As with past performance, we assess whether the impact of 
consultants’ recommendations on flows is channeled entirely through expectations, or whether 
these recommendations have an influence on flows which is distinct from their effect on 
expectations. The latter finding would be consistent with an agency problem, in which plan 
sponsors follow consultants’ recommendations to justify their investment decisions and shield 
themselves from responsibility.     
We find that plan sponsors’ expectations of performance are driven by past performance 
(consistent with the prevailing view of the early flow-performance literature), by investment 
consultants’ recommendations, and by the soft factors which they identify in their asset managers, 
such as having a consistent investment philosophy, clear decision making processes and capable 
investment professionals. However, neither plan sponsors’ expectations, nor past performance, 
nor the non-performance factor they evaluate in their asset managers, reliably predict the 
performance of those asset managers. 
As for flows, we find that these are at best only marginally a function of plan sponsors’ 
expectations, but they are driven significantly by past performance and by investment 
consultants’ recommendations far beyond the effect that these have on expectations. This is true 
whether we measure asset managers’ past performance using plan sponsors’ survey responses or 
using past excess returns over fund benchmarks or factor model alphas. 
These findings are consistent with a situation in which plan sponsors are not acting fully 
on their expectations when allocating assets, and points to both behavioral and agency effects. 
The partial dependency of expected performance on past performance and soft factors is not, in 
itself, irrational: investors could use such variables as signals of future performance. What does 
seem irrational is that past performance is relied upon when it is uninformative about future 
performance (except over periods too short for the plan sponsor to exploit); the same goes for 
soft factors, which are also poor predictors of future performance. The partial extrapolation of 
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expectations from past performance points to behavioral, rather than agency, effects: since 
investors’ expressions of past and expected performance are private, there is no reason to 
suppose that agency factors are at work.
4
 Our analysis therefore finds more direct evidence than 
in previous studies that institutional investors’ expectations contain an irrational component. 
On the other hand, the fact that investors do not act fully on their own expectations, but 
follow past performance and consultants recommendations when making investment decisions, 
is consistent with agency effects. According to this explanation, plan sponsors chase past 
performance and consultants’ recommendations because they feel that, as a rationale for 
selecting asset managers, these indicators are more defensible to their superiors, stakeholders and, 
possibly, the courts than their own expectations are. Since past performance and consultants’ 
recommendations are widely followed measures, plan sponsors also know that, if they fail, they 
‘fail conventionally’ (Keynes 1936). To this extent our findings support the suggestions in 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) that plan sponsors implement scapegoat strategies and their decisions 
are affected by career considerations and their interest in deflecting responsibility. 
Agency conflicts have been the subject of a number of recent papers on defined-benefit 
pensions. Rauh (2009) uses survey data to explore the allocation of assets in corporate pension 
funds as part of the wider risk management strategy of the sponsoring firm. Cocco and Volpin 
(2007) find that trustees appointed by the sponsoring company, as opposed to external trustees, 
are associated with lower returns to pension funds, while Phan and Hegde (2013) conclude that 
good corporate governance in general leads to higher investment returns. Our findings that plan 
sponsor officials are subject to conflicts in asset manager selection add to the body of empirical 
evidence of agency problems in institutional fund management. They highlight another type of 
conflict affecting this decision: plan directors making asset allocation decisions will likely have 
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 The GA survey responses are private, in contrast, for example, to analysts’ corporate earnings forecasts whose 
incentive structure and very public disclosure may mean that that they represent a biased reflection of the analysts’ 
expectations. 
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in mind not just the interests of plan participants, or of the shareholders of sponsoring firm, but 
their own interests and career concerns as well. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the institutional 
background and sources of data, Section III outlines our methodology and documents the results 
of our analysis, and Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Institutional background and data sources 
 
Institutional background 
 
‘Plan sponsors’ can be broken down into two broad categories: those responsible for retirement 
plans and those responsible for nonprofit assets. Retirement plans comprise corporate and public 
pension schemes, some managed for a single employer, others for more than one employer 
(Taft–Hartley multiemployer plans). Non-profit entities include foundations as well as university 
and other endowments. Based on Greenwich Associates data, U.S. plan sponsors’ assets, at the 
end of 2011, amounted to some $7.6 trillion, broken down as follows: corporate pension funds 
38%, public pension funds 47%, foundations and endowments 11% and unions 4%.  
Once plan sponsors have determined the apportionment of assets between asset classes, 
they tend to delegate the management of the funds within each class to outside asset managers. 
Asset managers may be hired and fired for a number of reasons, and not only to reflect 
performance. Thus, plan sponsors may make a strategic switch between asset classes (e.g., from 
equities to fixed income), or between styles (e.g., from value to growth), which could lead to the 
termination of a manager which has performed well in its category. On the other hand, plan 
sponsors may increase or decrease the funds delegated to asset managers without hiring or firing 
them; for example, imbalances between contributions (from the employer and employees) and 
payments (to beneficiaries) may cause plan sponsors to vary the volume of funds delegated to 
existing managers. 
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In selecting asset managers, many plan sponsors take the advice of investment 
consultants. Plan sponsors use consultants’ recommendations both when they first hire managers 
in an asset class, and when they replace managers within an asset class. As part of the hiring 
procedure, the consultant typically draws up a short list of its recommended fund managers, and 
the sponsor, advised by the consultant, chooses from among them. Estimates of the usage of 
investment consultants by plan sponsors vary, but they suggest that it is widespread. According 
to the Pensions and Investments survey of plan sponsors (2011), 94% of plan sponsors employ 
an investment consultant. Goyal and Wahal (2008) find that consultant usage varies by type of 
sponsors: for example, half of corporate pension plans in their sample use a consultant, while 
82% of local public plans do so. However, although plan sponsors may take advice from 
investment consultants, the fiduciary responsibility to select fund managers lies with the plan 
sponsors themselves.    
 
Data sources 
 
In compiling our dataset we draw on two sources. The first source comprises two series of 
surveys conducted by Greenwich Associates between 1999 and 2011. In one of these series, plan 
sponsors are asked to rate their asset managers on various measures of performance and service. 
In the second series of surveys, investment consultants are asked to rate asset managers 
according to the same set of measures, and also to state the names of the asset managers they 
recommend for each of a number of investment styles.
 5
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 Survey data play an important part in economics research in a number of fields, for example in the inflation 
expectations literature, where they are used as a means to access expectations directly rather than inferring them 
from other data (see e.g., Carroll, 2003; Leduc et al., 2007; Armantier et al., 2011; and Chernov and Mueller, 2012). 
The present paper attempts something similar: to analyze expectations without merely inferring them from actions 
(in this case asset flows) precisely in order to identify any mismatch between expectations and actions. For an 
example of the use of survey data to examine agency problems in corporate pension plans, see Rauh (2009). On the 
limitations of survey data, see Pesaran (2006).    
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The second source we use is a set of data provided by eVestment on the returns of 
institutional U.S. equity asset managers and their assets under management for the same period. 
We limit our analysis to U.S. long-only active equity asset managers. We provide further details 
below of each database, and of the way in which they are combined in our dataset. 
 
The Greenwich surveys. Since 1972 Greenwich Associates (GA) have conducted an annual 
survey of the judgements of plan sponsors on their asset managers. We draw on the surveys 
between 1999 and 2011. For the period before 1999 the GA survey is less complete; for example, 
it does not include questions on respondents’ perception of the performance of asset managers, 
which is central to our analysis.  For each year in this period the survey was carried out over a 
two- to three-month period starting between late June and early September of the same year. 
According to GA, the fraction of the total universe of U.S. plan sponsors who responded to the 
survey was on average 54% for the period; coverage has fluctuated during that period, and stood 
at 62% (1484 respondents) in 1999 against 43.5% (987 respondents) in 2011. The fraction of 
total assets under management (AUM) invested by the respondent plan sponsors was calculated 
only for the end of the period: in 2011 it stood at 52%. Measured either by the number of 
respondents or by their AUM, the GA survey therefore offers wide coverage of plan sponsors. 
The breakdown of respondents by the main types of plan sponsor (for the first and last years in 
our dataset) are Corporate Funds (1999: 58% of all respondents, 2011: 53%), Public Funds 
(1999: 23%, 2011: 21%) and Endowments and Foundations (1999: 19%, 2011: 22%). 
Respondents to the survey tend to express opinions on an entire asset class managed by 
each asset management group, (e.g., U.S. Domestic Equity managed by Firm ABC, International 
Fixed Income managed by Firm XYZ) rather than on products (i.e., groups of funds with 
essentially the same mandate) or individual funds within that class. For some of the larger firms, 
such as Fidelity, Goldman Sachs and Alliance Bernstein, the responses relate to groups of funds 
broken down by style, e.g., Value or Growth. Within each plan sponsor the GA questionnaire is 
answered by executives with a range of titles from Chairman of the Board to Assistant Treasurer. 
The most common title of the respondents is Chief Investment Officer. The incentive to answer 
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the questionnaire is that the respondent’s firm has access for the following twelve months to the 
aggregate results both of that survey and of other GA surveys. Responses to the questionnaire are 
private, and respondents may keep their responses entirely anonymous. However, they are asked 
if they would like their judgements on individual asset management firms to be made available 
to those firms; during the sample period around 50-60% of respondents chose to do so.   
 The headings under which respondents are asked to rate asset managers are divided by 
GA into two sets: investment factors and service factors. Two of the investment factors are 
‘performance factors’ and are quantitative in nature: one is the respondent’s assessment of the 
performance of the asset manager over the previous 2-3 years (past performance), and the other 
is the performance the respondent expects from the asset manager (expected future performance). 
The other three investment factors, which we call 'soft investment factors', are clear decision 
making, capability of portfolio manager, and consistent investment philosophy. The other set of 
categories in which asset managers are rated, the service factors, are as follows: useful informal 
meetings, capable relationship manager, useful formal meetings, credibility with investment 
committee, understanding objectives, and useful written reports. For each factor the respondent 
is invited to rate an asset manager’s performance in each asset class on a five-point scale. Under 
each factor GA then aggregates the responses into a single score for each asset manager in each 
asset class surveyed using the Rasch model (see Andrich, 1978). In this study we work with a 
modified version of these scores, the fractional rank, obtained by ranking the asset manager’s 
scores for each variable into percentiles and dividing them by 100 to arrive at a factor for each 
manager between zero and one.  
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 2011 plan sponsors survey, the most recent 
survey used in our study, and one of two for which we have disaggregated data. On average, 
each question is evaluated by 781 respondents (plan sponsors), each of whom expresses opinions 
on multiple asset managers, resulting in an average of 3194 evaluations for each question in the 
survey. 
Plan sponsors respond to survey questions about asset managers that they have appointed. 
This ensures that their responses on different managers are similarly well informed. As Table 1 
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shows, mean response scores in all categories lie towards the top of the 1-5 range, which is not 
especially surprising given that plan sponsors are evaluating managers which they presumably 
rated highly in the recent past. Negative views are less likely to make their way into the survey 
than if plan sponsors were rating managers they had not appointed. However, as we use relative 
rankings, this should not be a problem. What is important is that respondents should be able to 
discriminate between asset managers effectively on the various survey measures. As Table 1 
shows, this is the case. The F-test of identical means and the Kruskal-Wallis test (a non-
parametric alternative to the F-test more appropriate for ordinal data) show that the separation is 
effective across the question set; in particular, the responses are just as discriminating (and no 
more noisy) to questions on expected future performance as they are to those on past 
performance. These tests suggest that survey responses are informative about the variables of 
interest. 
GA also conduct an annual survey of investment consultants, in which they ask 
consultants to recommend between four and six asset managers for each of a number of 
investment styles (e.g., Large Cap Growth, Small Cap Value, etc). We use these responses to 
create a single measure which reflects investment consultants’ recommendations for each asset 
management firm for which we also have plan sponsor survey data. We combine the consultants’ 
recommendations for the same asset manager’s different investment styles, because the plan 
sponsors’ responses are given at the level of the asset class and not broken down by style (see 
Figure I for details). The consultants’ recommendation measure for each asset manager is 
expressed as a percentage of the highest possible number of recommendations which that asset 
manager could have received across all the style categories from all of the consultants combined. 
During the period under analysis, the survey of investment consultants was conducted between 
November of one year and March of the next. The consultants’ recommendation measure for 
each asset manager is based on the survey of consultants conducted immediately before the plan 
sponsor survey.
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The eVestment database. eVestment is a third party provider of analytic services for the 
institutional fund management industry. We draw data from two of their databases: one which 
tracks the monthly and quarterly returns of institutional asset managers, and one which tracks 
those funds’ assets under management (at an annual, and sometimes quarterly, frequency). The 
returns we obtain for these products are “composite” returns. The individual returns earned by 
each client may deviate from these composite returns, but deviations are typically small.
6
 
Composite returns are net of trading costs, but gross of investment management fees.
7
 The data 
are self-reported by the asset managers, but constant scrutiny from clients using this data 
guarantees a high degree of accuracy. The return data are free from survivorship bias. For each 
product, the databases also provide cross-sectional information on investment style and 
capitalization bracket, manager-designated benchmark, and the latest fees. The data on assets 
under management relate only to plan sponsors’ assets. The eVestment databases were first 
compiled in 2000, but include data from before that date. As at the end of 2012, the eVestment 
database had data on 4,274 U.S. equity funds which were active, and around 2,500 which were 
inactive (i.e., no longer reporting). One limitation of the database (commented on below) is that, 
once an asset manager is acquired and absorbed by the acquirer (rather than retaining its distinct 
identity), eVestment may not report data separately for the acquired firm for the period before 
the acquisition. 
 
Combining the databases. In order to make the eVestment data correspond to the GA asset class 
of Domestic U.S. Equity, we first eliminate index funds, hedge funds, REITs, and retail funds 
                                                 
6
 For example, some investors may require that their part of the overall portfolio is purged of, say, the influence of 
tobacco companies or arms manufacturers.  
7
 Only in Section III C do actual return data (rather than survey responses) play a central role. Here fees could 
potentially alter the results between gross and net returns. However, as we note in that section, fees for institutional 
products are largely homogeneous within size/style categories, so that it does not make a difference whether we use 
net or gross returns.  
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from the eVestment database. We keep a small number of so-called enhanced index funds, which 
are active funds aiming to achieve performance close to, but in excess of, an index; we do so on 
the grounds that these are active funds whose risk adjusted performance we can evaluate like that 
of any other. There are 347 unique asset manager names in the GA database (with 2,485 lines of 
data for the whole period). We match these unique GA asset manager names with the eVestment 
database and, in the process, eliminate 115 of them. The names eliminated fall into three 
categories. First, there are fourteen names for which GA has data for only one year, which rules 
out any time series analysis. Second, there are twelve names for which there is more than one 
possible match in the eVestment database. Third, there are 89 GA names which do not appear in 
the eVestment database. We identify 20 of these as firms that were acquired and absorbed by the 
acquirer but, since their performance and flow data is consolidated with that of the acquirer in 
the eVestment database even for the period before the acquisition, we eliminate them from the 
dataset. After these eliminations we are left with 232 asset manager unique names 
(corresponding to 1,630 lines of data for the sample period). 
The GA responses from each asset management group are for a size/style category, e.g. 
Large Cap Growth, whereas the performance and flow data from eVestment is by individual 
fund. We therefore group together in the eVestment database funds managed by a single asset 
management group which correspond to a given asset manager/asset class category in the GA 
survey. For example, if there are four individual funds in the eVestment database which fall into 
the category Large Cap Growth for Firm XYZ, we combine the performance and flow 
information data on these four funds in eVestment, allowing a like-for-like comparison with the 
GA survey responses; see Figure I for a description. In grouping fund-level data from eVestment 
in this way, we use a weighted average of the individual funds to measure performance, and we 
aggregate the flow information.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the final sample. The table shows the total 
number of U.S. domestic equity asset managers in our sample each year. It also shows the 
number of asset managers which reported assets under management (AUM) data, as well as their 
mean and median assets under management (in millions of U.S. dollars). Average assets in the 
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U.S. domestic active equity asset class per asset manager during the sample period are $18.9 
billion. End of year asset data are available for approximately 90% of the asset managers 
(although not necessarily for all their products). The availability of AUM data is high for the 
period with the exception of the first years.  
 
III. Methodology and results 
 
The first part of this section analyses plan sponsors’ expectations of the future performance of 
asset managers. In particular, it explores the contribution to expectations of past performance, 
soft investment factors, service factors (see Section II for a list of these factors), and investment 
consultants’ recommendations; it also examines the information content and biases in relative 
rankings of expected future performance. The second part examines how asset flows respond to 
plan sponsors’ expectations of the future performance of asset managers, to their past investment 
performance, to soft investment factors and service factors, and to investment consultants’ 
recommendations. 
 
A. How are expectations of future performance formed? 
 
In this section we try to shed light on what drives expectations of future performance, or more 
precisely, what drives the relative rankings of expected future performance. We also analyse the 
information content and biases in rankings of expected future performance. 
There is little evidence in the literature about how plan sponsors form their expectations 
of asset manager performance. One possible parallel is the extensive research on financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and expectations (see Ramnath, Rock and Shane, 2008, for a survey 
of this literature). However, there are important differences between the incentives under which 
analysts produce their earnings forecasts and those which apply to the respondents in the GA 
survey. Analysts' earnings forecasts are affected by an incentive structure liable to be 
inconsistent with conditionally unbiased forecasting, and many people argue that they cannot 
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therefore be used as valid proxies for true expectations.
8
 By contrast, we work with forecasts by 
plan sponsors of asset manager performance which are anonymous, and therefore more likely to 
qualify as faithful revelations of true expectations. 
Our emphasis is not on fully-fledged tests of rationality in (individual) expectations, but 
instead on an exploratory analysis of aggregate expectations: what they do and do not depend on, 
and whether these variables have any predictive power over actual future performance ranks.
9
 
We explore what drives aggregate expectations of future performance by estimating the 
following model on yearly data: 
 
  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
                𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                             (1) 
 
where Expected Perfi,t is the fractional rank at time t of the aggregate expected future 
performance of asset manager i's U.S. equity products in coming years; Past Perfi,t is the 
fractional rank at time t of the aggregate performance of asset manager i's U.S. equity products in 
the recent past (two to three years); Soft Inv. Factorsi,t is the fractional rank at time t of a set of 
                                                 
8
 Examples of the complex incentive structure faced by financial analysts include: their desire to gain investment 
banking/underwriting business (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dugar and Nathan, 1995); generate trading commissions 
(Dorfman (1991); please corporate managers (Francis and Philbrick, 1993); or follow career concerns (Hong, Kubik 
and Solomon, 2000). 
9
 Like many other studies, we analyse mean survey responses, the data available to us. As pointed out by Figlewski 
and Wachtel (1983) and Keane and Runkle (1990), using average survey response data rather than individual data 
can be problematic if the objective is to assess the rationality of the underlying individual expectations. It can lead to 
the false rejection of rational expectations because average forecasts that are conditional on different information 
sets are not rational forecasts conditional on any particular information set. Conversely, it can also lead to the false 
acceptance of rational expectations by masking systematic individual bias that may be randomly distributed in the 
population. Basu and Markov (2004) argue, however, that, to the extent that individual investors’ errors in 
processing information average out, the average responses are likely to be more accurate and closer to optimality 
than the individual survey responses. 
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soft investment factors of asset manager i's U.S. equity team (see Section II for a list of these 
factors); Service Factorsi,t is the fractional rank at time t of a set of service factors of asset 
manager i's U.S. equity team (see Section II for a list of these factors); and Consultants Recsi,t is 
the number of recommendations asset manager i received at time t, as a fraction of the highest 
possible number of recommendations which that asset manager could have received across all 
the style categories from all of the consultants in our sample combined. Fractional ranks 
represent the asset manager's percentile rank relative to other asset managers in the same 
size/style category and period, and ranges from 0 to 1. 
Table 3 reports the results of running this regression using pooled time-series cross-
sectional data. In this table each column represents a separate regression corresponding to six 
alternative specifications of equation (1). In most of these specifications past performance is 
proxied using reported past performance (in the survey). For robustness we also report results 
using past excess return over benchmarks (selected by eVestment, the data provider) and past 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas computed over the two-year period finishing at the 
end of the month preceding the survey as proxies.
10
 Most of these specifications include a lagged 
measure of log assets under management, return volatility and a full set of time dummies as 
controls. All survey variables used in the regressions refer to the asset class of U.S. active 
equities only. Given that survey respondents are asked to evaluate past and future performance 
over multiple overlapping periods, t-statistics reported in the table are based on standard errors 
clustered at the asset manager level (White, 1980 and Rogers, 1993). 
Results indicate that past performance is the key driver of plan sponsors’ expectations of 
asset managers’ future performance. Estimates in Table 3 indicate that moving from the 25th 
                                                 
10
 To generate aggregate past three-factor alphas and excess returns over benchmarks we create equal-weighted 
portfolio returns of all U.S. active equity products available from each asset manager in each month. With these 
returns, we estimate a three-factor model on monthly data, using market, size, and book-to-market factors, as in 
Fama and French (1993). We obtain these factors, as well as a monthly measure of the risk-free return, from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Following convention in the asset management industry we also 
compute the average return of the portfolio of products in excess of a similarly defined portfolio of benchmarks. 
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percentile of reported past performance to the 75th percentile results in an increase of 24 
percentiles in expected future performance. Using past excess returns over benchmarks, or three-
factor alphas to proxy for past performance, results in somewhat lower, but equally significant, 
estimates for the effect of changes in past performance on expectations of future performance.
11
 
This result is consistent with the view, common in the flow performance literature, that investors 
form expectations of future performance by extrapolating past performance.
12
 It also indicates 
that, in forming expectations, plan sponsors are ignoring the wealth of evidence that suggests that 
asset managers’ past investment performance is of little help in predicting future performance 
over horizons long enough for plan sponsors to exploit (see, for instance, Carhart, 1997; and 
Busse et al. 2010). 
Results in Table 3 also indicate that, in addition to past performance, soft investment 
factors, such as being perceived as having capable investment professionals or a clear decision 
making process, and, to a lesser but still significant extent, service factors, also drive 
expectations of future performance. The strong link between soft investment factors and 
investors’ expectations of future performance is unsurprising, given that these factors reflect the 
                                                 
11
 The difference in results depending on whether we use reported or actual past performance could reflect two 
phenomena. First, the measures of actual past performance we use may not coincide with what plan sponsors 
consider when they report past performance: the period they have in mind, and the basis of performance 
measurement, may be different. Second, the higher coefficient on reported past performance than on actual past 
performance may be due to plan sponsors projecting expectations of future performance onto past performance. We 
discuss these two possibilities at greater length in section B. 
12
 This view, coupled with evidence that individuals excessively extrapolate (past performance), is quite common in 
other related environments. For instance, De Bondt (1993), using classroom experiments and investors surveys, 
finds strong evidence that people extrapolate past trends; Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that investors make 
judgement errors and extrapolate past growth rates. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that people place too much 
emphasis in the latest news (large recent fund returns) and too little on base-rate information (e.g., whether past 
performance reliable leads to future performance). Placing excessive weight on recent past growth history, as 
opposed to a rational prior, is a common judgement error in psychological experiments related to the 
representativeness heuristic (see Kahneman et al. 1982). 
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quality of decision makers or decision making processes, which are characteristics typically 
thought to lead to investment success. However, service factors (such as meeting 
preparation/follow-up, useful informal meetings, and a capable relationship manager), which 
appear in principle unrelated to investment results, also seem to have a significant impact on 
expectations. This is perhaps because service factors are read by institutional investors as being 
informative about the general business practices of the asset manager, which might also be 
reflected in expected future performance. 
Investment consultants’ recommendations also seem to have an impact on expectations of 
future performance. Asset managers frequently short-listed by investment consultants are 
perceived as more likely to outperform other asset managers. This is true whether we look at the 
number of consultants’ short lists on which an asset manager appears, or the change in this 
number.
13
 
While past performance, soft investment factors and service factors, and consultants’ 
recommendations all seem to drive expectations of future performance, it is unclear whether 
these factors have any predictive power over actual future performance. We explore whether that 
is the case by replacing the measures of expected future performance in equation (1) with 
alternative measures of actual future performance, to estimate the following model: 
 
  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
                𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                       (2) 
 
where Perfi,t+1 is the actual excess return or three-factor alpha fractional rank of manager i’s U.S. 
active equity products over the next one or two years; and other variables are defined as before. 
                                                 
13
 It is worth noting that while consultants’ recommendations are collected from a survey conducted immediately 
before the plan sponsors survey, recommendation information is not necessarily in all plan sponsors’ information 
sets, as recommendations are typically private. 
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Excess returns and three-factor alphas are computed for the period commencing the 
month following the close of the survey and ending a full one or two years later. As before, to 
generate these aggregate measures of performance, we create equal-weighted portfolio returns of 
all U.S. active equity products available from each asset manager in each month. With these 
returns, we estimate a three-factor model on monthly data, using market, size, and book-to-
market factors, and we also compute the average return of the portfolio of products in excess of a 
similarly defined portfolio of benchmarks. 
The results, presented in Table 4, show that future performance is largely unpredictable 
from past performance, except perhaps at very short horizons (consistent with the findings of 
Bollen and Busse 2005 and Lou 2012), and also unpredictable from the assessments of plan 
sponsors about managers' various non-performance qualities. Consultants’ recommendations, 
once aggregated at the manager level, also seem largely unrelated to performance. Similar results, 
not reported here, obtain whether we use three-year future excess returns and three-factor alphas, 
or one- or four-factor alphas (corresponding to the CAPM, see Sharpe, 1964; and Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model, Carhart, 1997). 
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that plan sponsors’ expectations of 
future performance are systematically biased in the direction of past performance, and also in the 
direction of managers who are perceived as having good soft investment and service qualities. 
While plan sponsors may infer that managers whom they perceive to have done well in the past, 
to have clear decision making processes, and capable and credible investment professionals, will 
display superior future performance, this is usually not the case. 
We know that institutional investors’ forecasts of future performance rely partly on 
variables with no predictive power over future performance and are therefore biased in their 
direction. They could, however, still be informative about actual future performance. To explore 
this possibility we regress actual future performance rankings on expected future performance 
rankings and other survey and non-survey variables: 
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  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
                𝛽4𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                     (3)                                   
 
Like previous models, this model is also estimated using pooled time-series cross-
sectional data, and restricting the variables to the asset class of U.S. active equities only (the 
largest, most significant and most widely studied market). As before, t-statistics reported in the 
table are based on standard errors clustered at the asset manager level (White, 1980 and Rogers, 
1993). 
Results, displayed in Table 5, indicate that expected future performance is a poor 
predictor of actual future excess returns and alpha rankings, suggesting that it does not contain 
any information about future performance. The same can be said of other variables included in 
the regression. Past performance is the only variable that seems to have some predictive power 
over one-year alpha rankings, but not over two-year alpha or excess returns rankings. Even if it 
proved to be robust, it would be virtually impossible for plan sponsors to exploit this type of 
short lived predictability because of the delays in their investment process and the costs that 
would be incurred by frequently switching asset managers (see Goyal and Wahal 2008). 
To summarize, expectations of future performance are highly correlated with past 
performance, also correlated with other soft/intangible variables and are generally poor 
predictors of actual future performance. This evidence is consistent with plan sponsors 
extrapolating from past performance in forming their expectations of future performance.  
 
B. Do asset flows respond to expected future, or past, performance and non-performance 
indicators? 
 
The link between fund flows and past performance is the subject of an extensive literature; see, 
for instance, Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Del 
Guercio and Reuter (2013) for the retail mutual fund industry; or Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
and Goyal and Wahal (2008) for institutional/fiduciary pension investors. The traditional view, 
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in this literature, is that the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance is the result of people 
investing on the assumption that past performance, for real or imagined reasons, will persist into 
the future (Lynch and Musto, 2002).
14
  
In this study we not only use measures of past performance, as is standard in most of the 
literature, but we also have access to information on what investors expect the relative 
performance of their asset managers to be in the future. Arguably, the main - or sole - concern of 
plan sponsors should be the future performance of their investments. If so, we should expect to 
see asset flows responding to changes in expected future performance and, in principle, past 
performance should not matter. Agency problems, however, may lead trustees and other decision 
makers to base their decisions on past performance, even if they think that they know better. In 
this vein Lakonishok et al. (1992) argue that pension sponsor officials, as fiduciaries, have 
agency reasons to value manager characteristics that are easily justified to superiors or a trustee 
committee. One of the most obvious of these characteristics is the past performance of asset 
managers.
15
  
Agency problems within the sponsor’s organization may also reveal themselves in other 
ways. Plan sponsors, to shield themselves from adverse publicity associated with negative 
outcomes from their appointment of asset managers, may follow investment consultants’ 
recommendations, even if they are unconvinced by their advice (see Lakonishok et al, 1992; and 
Goyal and Wahal, 2008). Similarly if, as Lakonishok et al. (1992) claim, asset managers provide 
a service to pension officers consisting of direct interaction and hand-holding, institutional asset 
                                                 
14
 In much of the flow-performance literature, past performance is interpreted as a (noisy) signal of quality, and in 
principle informative about future performance. See, however, Berk and Green (2004) for a theoretical model where 
past performance signals quality and attracts flows, but it does not predict future performance, owing to the 
diminution of returns as successful asset managers attract extra assets. In Berk and Green’s (2004) model expected 
future performance is identical for all funds. 
15
 For example, trustees may fire a poorly performing manager as part of a scapegoat strategy, or they may hire an 
outstanding past performer to avoid being second-guessed ex post. 
 21 
flows may also respond to perceived changes in the level of service received from asset 
managers.  
We explore these issues by measuring how flows respond to lagged past, and expected 
future, investment performance, to changes in investment consultants’ recommendations, and to 
variables measuring soft service quality attributes. We estimate the response of flows to these 
variables using the following regression on yearly data: 
 
  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
               𝛽4𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡           (4) 
 
where 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ , TNAi,t is the total net assets for asset 
manager i at year t in the U.S. active equity asset class, ri,t is the asset weighted average return on 
asset manager i's U.S. active equity products between years t-1 and t. This flow measure reflects 
the growth of a fund in excess of the growth that would have occurred if no new money had 
flowed in but dividends had been reinvested, and it is expressed in percentage terms relative to 
total assets at the beginning of the period. ΔConsultants Recsi,t-1 is the change in the number of 
recommendations asset manager i received, as a fraction of the highest possible number of 
recommendations which that asset manager could have received across all the style categories 
from all of the consultants in our sample, between time t-2 and t-1, and all other variables are 
defined as before. 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating this regression using pooled time-series cross-
sectional data and including a lagged measure of log assets under management, return volatility 
and a full set of time dummies as controls. In this table each column represents a separate 
regression. For each of the explanatory variables (expected future performance, reported past 
performance or past excess returns, soft investment factors and service factors) the coefficient 
indicates the percentage change in assets in the current year which occurs if one moves from the 
bottom percentile to the top percentile of that variable. GA plan sponsors’ surveys are usually 
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conducted during the second part of the year (the last fielding date of the survey is between 
September and November depending on the year). Given that plan sponsors typically take time 
to implement investment decisions, it seems natural to use time t-1 and t-2 explanatory variables 
in the analysis. GA investment consultants’ surveys, on the other hand, are usually conducted 
early in the year (the last fielding date of this survey is never later than May), so we only lag the 
recommendations variable one period (t-1) in our analysis. t-statistics are based on clustered 
standard errors, which are White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors corrected for possible 
correlation across observations of a given asset manager in all of the regressions (White, 1980 
and Rogers, 1993). This method seems to be the most sensible given the size of our panel (see 
Petersen 2009).
16
 
In all six specifications the coefficients on lagged reported past performance or past 
excess returns over benchmarks (our measures of past performance) are positive and statistically 
significant. At the same time, the coefficient on lagged expected future performance is either not 
statistically different from zero or only mildly significant. The estimates in models I to VI 
indicate that moving from the bottom percentile of past performance to the top percentile is 
rewarded with a 31% increase in assets for the asset manager; but a similar change in expected 
future performance has only a minor impact on asset flows, or no impact at all. In models I, II, 
III and VI, where we proxy past performance using the reported measure of past performance in 
the GA survey, the effect of expected future performance on flows is never significant. In models 
IV and V, where we replace reported past performance with asset managers’ actual past excess 
returns over benchmarks, lagged expected future performance becomes a significant predictor of 
future flows, but its importance is still much smaller than that of lagged excess returns, and it 
becomes almost negligible when we control for a more complete set of actual past performance 
measures (see Appendix Table I). The estimates in model III also indicate that the main response 
                                                 
16
 Similar results obtain if asset manager and time fixed effects are used or if data is clustered in two dimensions, 
time and manager, as in Cameron et al. (2011). 
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of flows to past performance occurs within an interval of a little over a year, with no visible 
effects beyond that. 
The results in Table 6 were obtained using equally weighted measures of past 
performance but the same results hold when we use asset weighted measures of past performance. 
A robustness analysis conducted using alternative measures of past performance (past one or 
two-year 3-factor alphas or past one-year excess returns over benchmarks), shown in Appendix 
Table 1, paints a similar picture: on all the measures employed the analysis points to expected 
future performance having at best a second-order influence on flows.
17
 
The reason why the influence of expected future performance on future flows is marginal 
is not that the expected future performance variable we use is noisy – a common source of 
concern with survey data on expected returns (see Lamont, 2003; and Greenwood and Shleifer, 
2013). Although there is likely to be some noise in individual responses about future expected 
performance, the results of the two tests of no differences in scores among asset managers 
reported in Table 1, the F-test of identical means and the Kruskal-Wallis test, indicate that plan 
sponsors are as effective in separating asset managers in terms of their expected future 
performance as they are in terms of their past performance. That is, while there is some disparity 
in opinions, plan sponsors tend to agree about which asset managers will do well (and not) in an 
asset class, and they do so to a similar extent as they agree about asset managers’ past 
performance. This suggests that there is no significant difference in quality between the expected 
future performance variable and reported past performance, also a survey variable; yet when both 
are included in a multivariate regression framework it is mostly, or even only, past performance 
that matters for flows. 
                                                 
17
 The past excess returns and alpha measures we use are calculated gross of fees. The evidence is that in 
institutional funds fees are largely homogeneous within size/style categories, so that it does not make a difference to 
use returns gross of fees. We have fee records from eVestment for 2012 which show that there is little cross-section 
variation in fees. This is consistent with Busse et al. (2010): “[I]ntrastyle variation in fees is extremely small; almost 
all of the cross-sectional variation in fees is generated by investment styles” (2010: 772). 
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At the same time, the strong significance of past performance in these regressions does 
not seem to be the result of plan sponsors projecting their expectations regarding future 
performance into the reported past performance measure either (even when psychological factors 
are known to affect an individual’s perceptions or recollections of past events, see e.g., 
Goetzmann and Peles, 1997). When we replace reported past performance with non-survey 
measures of past performance (past excess returns and alphas) these past performance measures 
remain as significant as before. 
Our results show that past performance is a much more important driver of flows than 
expected future performance. This suggests that institutional investors do not so much allocate 
funds to those asset managers they think will do well in the future but to those that they think did 
well in the recent past. This behavior contradicts the most frequent interpretation of the flow-
performance relation that attributes the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance to a belief 
among investors that past performance will persist into the future. If extrapolative expectations 
were the main reason why plan sponsors chased past performance, the coefficient on expected 
future performance, but not that on past performance, would be highly significant when both are 
part of the regression estimation. That is not the case, however. That interpretation might be an 
accurate reflection of what happens in the retail mutual fund industry. Plan sponsors, however, 
are likely to be more sophisticated than retail mutual fund investors and also to have at their 
disposal advisors, notably investment consultants, to provide help.  
One possible explanation for this result, consistent with Lakonishok et al.’s (1992) 
arguments, is that, for agency reasons, trustees decide to base their decisions on the most 
observable and verifiable variable at their disposal, past performance, even if they think they 
know better. Trustees may attach unwarranted weight to this tangible piece of information (or 
non-information) simply because it is observable by the people they are appointed by or 
answerable to. Such behavior is particularly to be expected of sponsors who are most sensitive to 
“headline risk” (i.e., negative publicity) - the same investors who, according to Goyal and Wahal 
(2008), are likely to chase investment styles with high recent returns and to terminate managers 
for poor performance - but it is perhaps not limited to them. This behavior is akin to that of 
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money managers said to window-dress their portfolios at year-end by getting rid of poorly 
performing stocks that the sponsors might take as further evidence of low ability (Lakonishok et 
al. 1991); or to that of institutional investors who prefer glamour stocks because they appear to 
be “prudent” investments, and hence easy to justify to sponsors (Lakonishok et al. 1994).18 It is 
also consistent with the well-known, albeit perhaps outdated, market wisdom that “no one gets 
fired for buying IBM”.19  
A similar agency rationale may explain plan sponsors’ reliance on consultants’ 
recommendations. The estimates in models II to VI indicate that asset managers that go from not 
being short-listed at all by investment consultants to being short-listed by all the consultants in 
the survey for all their products experience a 68% increase in assets (model II), even after 
controlling for the effect these recommendations have on plan sponsors’ expectations of future 
performance. This suggests that institutional investors not only follow consultants’ 
recommendations, as we would expect, but that they follow them regardless of their belief in 
their value.
20
 
Regarding service quality, results in Table 6 suggest that fund flows do not respond to 
measures of service quality, once we control for perceived past and expected future performance. 
Plan sponsors might use service factors, together with other variables, to infer future 
performance, but service quality does not seem to be valuable in itself. This is true when looking 
                                                 
18
 For evidence of how the prudent man rule affects fiduciaries’ portfolio decisions see also Badrinath, Gay and Kale 
(1989) and Del Guercio (1996). 
19
 See Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995) for theoretical models providing examples of situations 
where agents may decide to act in ways that seem to ignore their own expectations or substantive private 
information. 
20
 Given that the GA investment consultants’ surveys take place several months ahead of their plan sponsors’ 
surveys, it seems natural to believe that plan sponsors are aware of consultants’ recommendations at the time of 
answering about their expectations of future performance. Consultants’ recommendations are only available to plan 
sponsors who hire consultants, and it is through this channel that they affect both expectations of future performance 
and flows. 
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at service quality factors as a whole (models I to V), or individually (model VI); or even if we 
consider changes in service quality as the dependent variable instead of levels (not reported). 
It could be, however, that service factors are important only if the investment 
performance of the asset manager is not good or if the quality of these service factors is very 
poor. To explore these possibilities we estimate the following model: 
 
  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2[𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃 ] + 𝛽3[𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
(1 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃 )] + 𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5[𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 ] +
𝛽6[𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 )] + 𝛽7𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                            
                                                                  (5) 
 
where M = PP (Past Performance) or SF (Service Factors), depending on the specification; 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃  
is an indicator variable equaling one if unscaled Past Perfi,t-1 is lower than a given threshold and 
zero otherwise; and 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝐹  is another indicator variable equaling one if unscaled Service Factorsi,t-
1 is lower than a given threshold and zero otherwise. Past Perfi,t-1  and Service Factorsi,t-1 are re-
scaled by subtracting the threshold value to make this a continuous piecewise linear model. All 
other variables are defined as before.  
The results of estimating this model are collected in Table 7. In addition to the usual 
statistics this table also reports the p-values of an F-test of equality of coefficients between the 
slopes of past performance and service quality above (+) and below (-) a given threshold. The 
threshold is defined by either the 33
rd
 or 50
th
 percentile of past performance or service quality. 
Together with the results of Table 6, these results indicate that, while asset flows are, in general, 
not very sensitive to past service quality, they become more sensitive when service quality is 
poor (models II and V). This is consistent with the view that when service quality is poor 
investors seem more likely to abandon an asset manager but that having good service quality is 
unlikely to attract funds by itself.
21
 It is also consistent with the hypothesis that pension officers 
                                                 
21
 The same results obtain if we do not force intercepts (of the piecewise linear regression models) to coincide. 
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value direct interaction with asset managers and hand-holding, in line with Lakonishok et al. 
(1992);
22
 indeed, it is consistent with any interpretation according to which plan sponsors would 
be expected to value a minimum level of service quality from their asset managers. Estimates in 
models III and VI, seem, however, to show that service quality is not necessarily more important 
when performance is bad;
 
this suggests that service quality is valued in general, and not merely 
to help pension officers explain poor performance.
 
 
Estimates in models I and IV in Table 7 also suggest that the relation between flows and 
past performance is nearly linear. This is consistent with the findings of Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2002) who document a nearly linear relation for institutional investors, in contrast to studies of 
the retail mutual fund industry which typically find a convex relation between flows and 
performance. Evidence collected in this table also indicates that soft investment factors are not 
very important for asset flows.  
To summarize, we find that plan sponsors allocate funds, not so much to those asset 
managers they think will do well in the future, but to those that they think did well in the recent 
past and to those recommended by investment consultants. This behavior points to agency 
problems in that it is consistent with trustees basing their decisions on the most defensible 
variables at their disposal, past performance and advice received from investment consultants, 
even if they think they know better. However, since expected future performance is not a good 
predictor of actual future performance, the observed tendency of plan sponsors not to act on their 
own expectations, or do so only modestly, and to base their decisions on more tangible variables 
instead, such as past performance or consultants’ recommendations, does not necessarily have 
costly implications for ultimate investors. We further find that non-performance factors, that is, 
soft investment factors and service factors, have only a mild effect on flows: good service quality 
is unlikely to attract funds on its own, although asset flows do become more sensitive to service 
quality when it is poor, regardless of whether performance is good or bad. 
                                                 
22
 See also Gennaioli et al. (2015) for a similar hypothesis applied to the mutual fund market, according to which 
managers provide individual investors with ‘peace of mind’ in addition to investment performance. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Using survey data for 1999-2011 we analyze the views of plan sponsors on their asset managers. 
These views include judgments about asset managers' past and future performance, as well as 
about non-performance factors including the business processes of their asset managers, the 
quality of their personnel and their service delivery. We explore how performance and non-
performance factors interact in plan sponsors' survey responses, and how these relate to the flow 
of funds into the same asset managers.  
Consistent with the view, common in the mutual fund literature, that investors extrapolate 
from past performance, we find that the future performance expected of asset managers is driven 
largely by past performance. However, to the extent that the two performance measures are 
distinct, it is past performance that is the main determinant of asset flows and, once we control 
for past performance, expected future performance has little explanatory power over them. We 
also find that flows are strongly influenced by investment consultants’ recommendations, and 
that this influence goes beyond the impact those recommendations may have on plan sponsors’ 
expectations. These two findings suggest that that investors are not acting fully on their own 
expectations when making their asset allocation decisions. 
These results shed light on decision making by plan sponsors, in that they suggest 
separate roles for behavioral and agency effects. The apparent tendency for plan sponsors, when 
forming their expectations, to extrapolate from past performance and rely on soft factors when 
neither of these is informative about future performance (except, perhaps, over periods too short 
to exploit) appears irrational. It is doubtful that these findings can be explained by agency 
problems, since survey responses are private and likely to be a faithful reflection of respondents' 
beliefs. 
By contrast, the fact plan sponsors do not act on their own expectations, or do so only 
marginally, when making investment decisions is consistent with agency rather than behavioral 
effects on the part of plan sponsors. A behavioral explanation for this would require us to believe 
 29 
that plan sponsors take the trouble to form expectations about the future but then, unwittingly, 
fail to act on those expectations. It seems more likely that their actions are at variance with their 
own expectations because they feel that past performance and consultants’ recommendations are 
a more defensible explanation for their decisions to their the superiors and other stakeholders. 
The policy implications of this are sobering. For, as long as sponsors consider that they will be 
judged by others who do believe that past performance and consultants’ recommendations are 
informative about future performance, sponsors will behave as if they do so themselves, even if 
this is not the case.  
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Appendix – Robustness Analysis 
 
In Appendix Table I, we extend the analysis of Table 6 (Section 2. B) by regressing asset 
flows on a wider set of past performance measures. The analysis confirms our findings: whatever 
benchmark of past performance is chosen (past one- or two-year 3-factor alphas or past one-year 
excess returns over benchmarks), expected future performance has at best a second-order 
influence on flows.    
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F test (p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis 
test (p-value)
Expected Future Performance 761 3000 4.00 0.75 0.0000*** 0.0001***
Reported Past Performance 808 3143 3.81 0.88 0.0000*** 0.0001***
     Soft Investment Factors
Consistent Inv. Philosophy 808 3155 4.24 0.70 0.0000*** 0.0001***
Clear Decision Making 785 3048 4.18 0.71 0.0000*** 0.0001***
Capable Inv. Professionals 797 3082 4.24 0.69 0.0000*** 0.0001***
     Service Factors
Understanding of Objectives 824 3552 4.12 0.79 0.0109** 0.0090***
Relationship Manager 828 3508 4.11 0.78 0.0005*** 0.0016***
Credibility 777 3326 4.12 0.79 0.0000*** 0.0001***
Useful Written Reports 782 3337 3.90 0.74 0.0092*** 0.0315**
Useful Formal Meetings 733 3094 4.02 0.75 0.0095*** 0.032**
Useful Informal Meetings 691 2893 4.03 0.75 0.0133** 0.0235**
Greenwich Associates plan sponsors survey summary statistics
The table shows, for each variable included in the 2011 Greenwich Associates survey of plan sponsors: the number of respondents to the survey 
that provided answers about that variable; the number of evaluations (each plan sponsor typically evaluates more than one asset manager); the 
mean and standard deviation of the individual scores; and the p-values of two tests of no differences in scores among asset managers: the F-test 
of identical means and the Kruskal-Wallis test.
Table 1
# Respondents # Evaluations Mean score Std. dev.
Tests of no difference in scores 
among asset mgrs.
GA Variable
# of Asset 
Managers in 
sample
# % of Total
Mean AUM 
$Million
Median AUM 
$Million
1999 77 26 34% 10,687 6,516
2000 85 41 48% 12,387 3,805
2001 86 65 76% 17,169 8,983
2002 109 95 87% 16,324 7,223
2003 101 92 91% 15,089 7,829
2004 115 102 89% 19,264 9,848
2005 128 116 91% 21,014 10,130
2006 130 123 95% 23,567 11,041
2007 154 143 93% 23,909 9,421
2008 170 152 89% 22,914 10,051
2009 145 135 93% 14,791 7,157
2010 161 148 92% 16,719 7,312
2011 169 159 94% 18,085 8,259
Total 232 213 92% 18,891 4,232
Sample Statistics
The table shows the total number of U.S. domestic equity asset managers in our sample each year. It also shows the number of 
asset managers which reported assets under management (AUM) data, as well as their mean and median assets. Mean and median 
assets under management are in millions of U.S. dollars.
Asset Managers with AUM data
Table 2
I II III IV V VI
Reported Past Performance (t) 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47***
(20.11) (17.72) (17.43) (17.38)
Past Excess Return (t) 0.18***
(6.38)
Past 3-Factor Alpha (t) 0.15***
(5.30)
Soft Investment Factors (t) 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.56*** 0.57***
(10.93) (10.43) (10.40) (10.26) (19.05) (19.52)
Service Factors (t) 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(2.81) (3.35) (3.38) (3.35) (3.66) (3.67)
Consultants' Recommendations (t) 0.20* 0.16 0.25* 0.24*
(1.84) (1.46) (1.79) (1.71)
Chg. in Consultants' Recommendations (t) 0.29* 0.21 0.44** 0.52**
(1.66) (1.15) (2.09) (2.44)
Total Net Assets (t-1) -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.42) (0.06) (-0.35) (-1.33) (-1.46)
Return Volatility (t-1) 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.10
(0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (-0.51) (-0.71)
Intercept 0.05*** 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.15** 0.17***
(5.62) (1.29) (1.02) (1.27) (2.57) (2.82)
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.51 0.50
Number of observations 1,623 1,390 1,364 1,364 1,339 1,339
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of expected future performance rankings on reported past 
performance (alternatively past excess return over benchmark or Fama-French 3-factor alpha), soft investment factor and service factor rankings. 
Expected future performance, reported past performance, past excess return over benchmark, 3-factor alpha, and soft investment factor and 
service factor rankings are expressed using the fractional rank of each asset manager in the sample. An asset manager's fractional rank, for a 
given variable, represents its percentile rank relative to other asset managers in the same period, and ranges from zero to one. Some regressions 
also include a measure of the number of investment consultants’ recommendations received (over the total possible) by the asset manager, or its 
change, lagged log assets under management and return volatility.  Each column represents a separate regression. t-statistics based on standard 
errors clustered at the asset manager level are included in parenthesis.
What drives expectations of future performance
Table 3
Reported Past Performance (t) 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03
(0.89) (-1.19) (1.43) (-0.70)
Past Excess Return (t) 0.05 -0.03
(1.64) (-0.91)
Past 3-Factor Alpha (t) 0.07** 0.05
(2.27) (1.35)
Soft Investment Factors (t) -0.06 -0.06* -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
(-1.64) (-1.90) (-0.60) (-1.38) (-0.85) (-0.78) (-0.61) (-1.38)
Service Factors (t) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(1.34) (1.48) (0.90) (0.91) (-0.30) (-0.19) (0.48) (0.42)
Consultants' Recommendations (t) -0.05 -0.04 -0.29 -0.28 0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.08
(-0.28) (-0.24) (-1.31) (-1.25) (0.10) (0.19) (-0.40) (-0.36)
Total Net Assets (t-1) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.64) (-0.82) (-0.18) (-0.12)
Return Volatility (t-1) 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.12 -0.13 -0.14 0.19 0.19
(0.11) (0.20) (0.54) (0.51) (-0.74) (-0.82) (0.85) (0.84)
Intercept 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.45***
(10.41) (9.95) (7.59) (7.44) (10.08) (9.93) (7.13) (6.80)
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Number of observations 1,196 1,193 1,031 1,029 1,196 1,193 1,031 1,029
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
1-Year 2-Year 2-Year1-Year
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of future excess returns or Fama-French 3-factor alpha rankings on reported past 
performance (alternatively past excess returns or Fama-French 3-factor alpha), soft investment factor and service factor rankings. Excess returns (t) and 3-factor alphas 
(t) are computed for the one-year and two-year periods starting one week after the last fielding date of the survey. Past excess returns (t) and past 3-factor alphas (t) are 
computed for the two-year periods finishing one week before the first fielding date of the survey. Excess returns, 3-factor alphas, reported past performance, and the soft 
investment factor and service factor rankings are expressed using the fractional rank of each asset manager in the sample. An asset manager's fractional rank, for a given 
variable, represents its percentile rank relative to other asset managers in the same period, and ranges from zero to one. All regressions also include a measure of the 
number of investment consultants’ recommendations received (over the total possible) by the asset manager, lagged log assets under management and return volatility.  
Each column represents a separate regression. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the asset manager level are included in parenthesis.
Table 4
The relation between future performance and past performance, soft investment factors and service factors
Excess Return Ranking 3-Factor Alpha Ranking
Expected Future Performance (t) -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.07* -0.04 0.02 -0.01
(-0.98) (-0.73) (0.11) (-0.32) (-1.79) (-1.18) (0.43) (-0.20)
Reported Past Performance (t) 0.05 -0.05 0.08** -0.04
(1.33) (-0.99) (2.23) (-0.79)
Past Excess Return (t) 0.05* -0.03
(1.80) (-0.77)
Past 3-Factor Alpha (t) 0.08** 0.05
(2.45) (1.37)
Soft Investment Factors (t) -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-0.62) (-1.03) (-0.25) (-0.06) (-0.73) (-1.12)
ServiceFactors (t) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02
(1.40) (1.53) (0.89) (0.93) (-0.16) (-0.08) (0.45) (0.44)
Consultants' Recommendations (t) -0.04 -0.03 -0.30 -0.28 0.04 0.05 -0.09 -0.08
(-0.22) (-0.19) (-1.31) (-1.23) (0.21) (0.27) (-0.42) (-0.35)
Total Net Assets (t-1) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.28) (-0.24) (-0.69) (-0.91) (-0.17) (-0.13)
Return Volatility (t-1) 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.12 -0.13 -0.14 0.19 0.19
(0.12) (0.21) (0.54) (0.51) (-0.75) (-0.83) (0.85) (0.84)
Intercept 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.45***
(10.44) (9.98) (7.56) (7.48) (10.16) (10.08) (7.08) (6.79)
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Number of observations 1,196 1,193 1,031 1,029 1,196 1,193 1,031 1,029
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
1-Year 2-Year 1-Year 2-Year
3-Factor Alpha Ranking
Table 5
Is there any information in expected future performance rankings?
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of future excess returns or Fama-French 3-factor alpha rankings on expected future 
performance rankings and other variables. Excess returns (t) and 3-factor alphas (t) are computed for the one-year and two-year periods starting one week after the last fielding 
date of the survey. Past excess returns (t) and past 3-factor alphas (t) are computed for the two-year periods finishing at the end of the month preceding the first fielding date of 
the survey. Excess returns, 3-factor alphas, expected future performance, reported past performance, and soft investment factor and service factor rankings are expressed using 
the fractional rank of each asset manager in the sample. An asset manager's fractional rank, for a given variable, represents its percentile rank relative to other asset managers in 
the same period, and ranges from zero to one. All regressions also include a measure of the number of investment consultants’ recommendations received (over the total 
possible) by the asset manager, lagged log assets under management and return volatility. Each column represents a separate regression. t-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered at the asset manager level are included in parenthesis.
Excess Return Ranking
I II III IV V VI
Expected Future Performance (t-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.10*** 0.06** -0.03
(-0.15) (-0.25) (-1.16) (3.19) (2.07) (-0.70)
Expected Future Performance (t-2) 0.06 0.06*
(1.40) (1.76)
Reported Past Performance (t-1) 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(7.84) (7.93) (6.91) (7.61)
Reported Past Performance (t-2) 0.02
(0.68)
Past Excess Return (t-1) 0.31*** 0.27***
(10.88) (7.64)
Past Excess Return (t-2) 0.04
(1.38)
Soft Investment Factors (t-1) -0.08* -0.08* -0.05 -0.01 0.01
(-1.75) (-1.74) (-1.20) (-0.27) (0.36)
Soft Investment Factors (t-2) -0.05 -0.03
(-0.82) (-0.54)
  - Consistent Inv. Philosophy (t-1) 0.02
(0.51)
  - Clear Decision Making (t-1) -0.09*
(-1.76)
  - Capable Inv. Professionals (t-1) 0.01
(0.17)
Service Factors (t-1) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.41) (0.72) (0.32) (0.14) (-0.45)
Service Factors (t-2) 0.01 0.01
(0.30) (0.34)
  - Understanding of Objectives (t-1) 0.00
(0.04)
  - Relationship Manager (t-1) -0.03
(-0.71)
  - Credibility (t-1) -0.01
(-0.18)
  - Useful Written Reports (t-1) -0.06
(-1.31)
  - Useful Formal Meetings (t-1) 0.05
(1.10)
  - Useful Informal Meetings (t-1) 0.07
(1.63)
Chg. in Consultants' Recommendations (t-1) 0.68*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.47** 0.68***
(3.79) (2.73) (3.17) (2.57) (3.76)
Total Net Assets (t-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.23) (-0.72) (-0.18) (-1.51)
Return Volatility (t-1) -0.37 -0.38 -0.86* -0.72* -1.15*** -0.43
(-0.89) (-0.89) (-1.92) (-1.75) (-2.65) (-0.98)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16
Number of observations 1,207 1,169 1,044 1,157 1,035 1,169
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of asset managers' yearly asset flows on lagged past, and expected future, 
investment performance, variables measuring soft investment factors and service factors, and investment consultants’ recommendations. The sample includes 
asset managers’ U.S. active equity products only. These products are aggregated into a single observation for each asset manager-year. Asset flows are expressed 
as percentages of total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Past performance is proxied using reported past performance (in the survey) or 
the excess return computed over the two-year period finishing at the end of the month preceding the first fielding date of the previous year survey. Past and 
expected future performance, soft investment factors, and service factors are expressed using the fractional rank of each asset manager in the sample. An asset 
manager's fractional rank, for a given variable, represents its percentile rank relative to other asset managers in the same period, and ranges from zero to one. The 
change in consultants’ recommendations is the change in the percentage of short list recommendations received over the total possible. All regressions also 
include a lagged measure of log assets under management, return volatility and a full set of time dummies (which are not reported in the table).  Each column 
represents a separate regression. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the product level are included in parenthesis.
Effect of past and expected performance, soft investment factors, service factors and consultants' recommendations on asset 
flows
Table 6
I II III IV V VI
Expected Future Performance (t-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.28)
Reported Past Performance (t-1) 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.33***
(7.95) (7.92) (7.99) (7.94)
Rep. Past Perf. * I(PP<threshold) (t-1) 0.42*** 0.49***
(4.76) (3.83)
Rep. Past Perf. * I(PP>threshold) (t-1) 0.22*** 0.26***
(3.34) (5.35)
Soft Investment Factors (t-1) -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08*
(-1.72) (-1.76) (-1.76) (-1.74) (-1.78) (-1.76)
Service Factors (t-1) 0.02 0.02
(0.65) (0.67)
Service Factors * I(SF<threshold) (t-1) 0.13* 0.26**
(1.92) (2.15)
Service Factors * I(SF>threshold) (t-1) -0.07 -0.04
(-1.12) (-0.97)
Service Factors * I(PP<threshold) (t-1) 0.05 0.09*
(1.03) (1.67)
Service Factors * I(PP>threshold) (t-1) 0.01 0.00
(0.16) (0.05)
Chg in Consultants' Recommendations (t-1) 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.69***
(3.80) (3.88) (3.69) (3.82) (3.91) (3.82)
Total Net Assets (t-1) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(-1.56) (-1.60) (-1.46) (-1.56) (-1.64) (-1.43)
Return Volatility (t-1) -0.36 -0.41 -0.39 -0.38 -0.44 -0.40
(-0.84) (-0.95) (-0.90) (-0.89) (-1.03) (-0.92)
Test Past Perf (+) = Past Perf (-) 0.13 0.12
Test Serv. Fact. (+) = Serv. Fact. (-) 0.07* 0.63 0.03** 0.13
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15
Number of observations 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Threshold 0.33
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of asset managers' yearly asset flows on lagged past, and expected 
future, investment performance, variables measuring soft investment factors and service factors, and investment consultants’ recommendations. 
Asset flows are expressed as percentages of total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Past and expected future performance, 
soft investment factors and service factors are expressed using the fractional rank of each asset manager in the sample. To test for nonlinearities in 
the flow-performance/service quality relation we estimate separate lagged performance and service factor coefficients for those asset managers 
ranked above and below a given threshold (defined, alternatively, by the 33rd and 50th percentile of service quality and past performance). PP and 
SF stand for past performance and service factors respectively. The change in consultants’ recommendations is the change in the percentage of short 
list recommendations received over the total possible. All regressions also include a lagged measure of log assets under management, return 
volatility and a full set of time dummies (which are not reported in the table).  Each column represents a separate regression. t-statistics based on 
standard errors clustered at the product level are included in parenthesis.
The effect of investment performance and service quality on asset flows: nonlinearities
Threshold 0.5
Table 7
Figure I 
Combined Sample: Level of Analysis 
Greenwich Associates’ (GA) plan sponsors’ survey is at the asset manager/asset class level containing one score for each asset manager in each 
asset class (e.g. Fidelity U.S. Active Equities, Fidelity U.S. Active Fixed Income, Fidelity U.K. Active Equities, etc.). The GA consultants’ 
recommendations survey is at the level of each asset manager/size/style category (e.g. Fidelity Large Cap Growth, Fidelity Mid Cap Value, etc.). 
The eVestment database has performance and assets under management data for individual funds (e.g. Fidelity Mid Cap Value Fund, Fidelity 
Small Cap Growth Fund, etc.) within a complex. In the majority of cases, there is only one individual fund per manager/size/style category. 
Level of 
analysis  
Source  
of data  
                                                                        Stylized  
                                                                        example  
   
Asset 
manager/asset 
class level  
GA survey of plan 
sponsors’ views on asset 
managers’ non-
performance factors  
                                                            
Firm XYZ Active U.S. Equities 
         
Size/style level  GA survey of consultants’ 
recommendations of funds 
by size/style category  
XYZ 
Large Cap 
Growth  
XYZ Large 
Cap Value  
XYZ Mid 
Cap Growth  
XYZ Mid 
Cap Value  
XYZ Small 
Cap Growth  
XYZ Small 
Cap Value  
XYZ 
Core 
Equity  
         
Fund level  eVestment flows and 
performance database by 
individual fund  
Fund 1  
 
Fund 1  
Fund 2 
etc… 
Fund 1  
 
Fund 1  
Fund 2 
 
Fund 1  
 
Fund 1  
 
Fund 1  
Fund 2 
 
 
I II III IV V VI
Expected Future Performance (t-1) 0.12*** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.07** 0.10*** 0.05
(3.58) (2.59) (3.17) (2.14) (3.09) (1.54)
Expected Future Performance (t-2) 0.05 0.05 0.06*
(1.56) (1.52) (1.87)
Excess Return (t-1) 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.11** -0.09
(4.05) (2.61) (2.30) (-1.06)
Excess Return (t-2) 0.05 0.13**
(1.03) (2.33)
One-Year Excess Return (t-1) 0.15*** 0.26***
(2.95) (3.87)
One-Year Excess Return (t-2) 0.05
(0.69)
3-Factor Alpha (t-1) 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.19**
(9.24) (7.76) (2.91) (2.89) (2.99) (2.51)
3-Factor Alpha (t-2) 0.03 -0.01 0.01
(0.92) (-0.20) (0.10)
One-Year 3-Factor Alpha (t-1) -0.03 -0.03
(-0.54) (-0.45)
One-Year 3-Factor Alpha (t-2) -0.04
(-0.69)
Soft Investment Factors (t-1) -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
(-0.01) (0.51) (-0.17) (0.41) (-0.15) (0.39)
Soft Investment Factors (t-2) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.28)
Service Factors (t-1) -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(-0.06) (-0.62) (-0.03) (-0.63) (-0.05) (-0.65)
Service Factors (t-2) 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.30) (0.28) (0.21)
Chg. in Consultants' Recommendations (t-1) 0.66*** 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.48** 0.64*** 0.50***
(3.54) (2.88) (3.21) (2.60) (3.46) (2.68)
Total Net Assets (t-1) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.17) (-0.58) (-1.00) (-0.42) (-1.06) (-0.65)
Return Volatility (t-1) -1.23*** -1.68*** -1.02** -1.46*** -1.15*** -1.69***
(-2.78) (-3.50) (-2.46) (-3.29) (-2.78) (-3.84)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22
Number of observations 1,157 1,035 1,157 1,035 1,157 1,035
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of asset managers' yearly asset flows on lagged past, and expected future, investment 
performance, variables measuring soft investment factors and service factors, and investment consultants’ recommendations. The sample includes asset managers’ 
U.S. active equity products only. These products are aggregated into a single observation for each asset manager-year. Asset flows are expressed as percentages of 
total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Past performance is proxied using several measures: the excess return and 3-factor alphas (also the 
one-year excess return and 3-factor alphas) computed over the two-year (one-year) period finishing at the end of the month preceding the first fielding date of the 
previous year survey. Past and expected future performance, soft investment factors, and service factors are expressed using the fractional rank of each asset 
manager in the sample. An asset manager's fractional rank, for a given variable, represents its percentile rank relative to other asset managers in the same period, and 
ranges from zero to one. The change in consultants’ recommendations is the change in the percentage of short list recommendations received over the total possible. 
All regressions also include a lagged measure of log assets under management, return volatility and a full set of time dummies (which are not reported in the table).  
Each column represents a separate regression. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the product level are included in parenthesis.
Effect of past and expected performance, soft investment factors, service factors and consultants' recommendations on asset 
flows - Additional past performance measures
Appendix Table 1
